Retroactive Administrative Decisions by Berger, Raoul
19671
RETROACTIVE ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONS
RAoTL BmGm f
While courts have been striking the shackles of retroactivity, the
administrative process, fondly viewed as a progressive development in
the art of government,' anomalously lays claim to, and often callously
exercises, a retrospective adjudicatory power which is the product of
discredited assumptions. Decisional retroactivity, which is associated
with inflexible judicial habit, is paradoxically embraced by adminis-
trative agencies in the name of flexibility.'
Judicial retroactivity was an outgrowth of the "declaratory
theory" that judges never make law, they merely discover it. Conse-
quently an overruled decision was "never the law" but "only a failure
at true discovery," ' and in this light retrospective operation was under-
standably deemed to be a "logical necessity." ' Austin justly labeled
this theory a "childish fiction," ' and he is but one of a roster of great
names that includes Bentham, Holmes, Pollock and Cardozo.6 Now
t A.B. 1932, University of Cincinnati. J.D. 1935, Northwestern University.
LL.M. 1938, Harvard University. Chairman, ABA Section on Administrative Law,
1961-62.
1 LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 1-2, 5, 46 (1938) ; cf. 1 DAVIS, AimiNs-
TrATiV LAw TREATISE § 1.05, at 34-43 (1958) [hereinafter cited as DAVS] ; GLL=HORN
& BYsE, ADMINISTRATVE LAW: CASES AND COMMENTS 2-6, 9 (4th ed. 1960).
2 Leedom v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 278 F.2d 237, 243 (D.C. Cir.
1960); Shawmut Ass'n v. SEC, 146 F.2d 791, 796-97 (1st Cir. 1945).
8 Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 623-24 (1965); see Berger, Estoppel
Against the Government, 21 U. CHI. L. REv. 680, 703 (1954); Kocourek & Koven,
Renovation of the Common Law Through Stare Decisis, 29 ILL. L. R v. 971, 985-87
(1935).
4 Snyder, Retrospective Operation of Overruling Decisions, 35 IL. L. REv. 121,
122 (1940).
5 2 AusTIN, JURISPRUDENCE 655 (4th ed. Campbell 1873).
6 See Berger, supra note 3, at 703 nn.142 & 144. Cardozo was an early pro-
ponent of prospective operation where a retroactive judicial declaration was inex-
pedient. 55 N.Y. STATE BAR Ass'N REtP. 263, 295-97 (1932). See also the remarks
of Judge Jerome Frank in Aero Spark Plug Co. v. B.G. Corp., 130 F.2d 290, 298
(2d Cir. 1942) (concurring opinion). For a review of the literature see Levy,
Realist Jurisprudence and Prospective Overruling, 109 U. PA. L. REv. 1 (1960);
Note, 71 YAIE L.J. 907 (1962).
Professor Kocourek had concluded in 1935 that "the rule of retrospection is
gradually losing ground in nearly all fields of law . . . . The idea of retrospection
is contrary to the basic assumption of law as a system for the regulation of social
behavior." Kocourek & Koven, supra note 3, at 997. Justice Schaefer recently
wrote that since Great No. Ry. v. Sunburst Oil & Ref. Co., 287 U.S. 358 (1932)
(see text accompanying notes 141-43 infra), "state courts have, with increasing fre-
quency, coupled the overruling of an earlier decision with an announcement that
the new rule will not be given retroactive effect. The primary purpose, of course,
is to avoid frustration of justifiable reliance upon the old rule . . . ." Schaefer,
Chief Justice Traynor and the Judicial Process, 53 CALIF. L. Rov. 11, 17 (1965).
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the Supreme Court, in Linkletter v. Walker,7 has also concluded that
retroactivity is not a categorical imperative.
Behind Linkletter lie factors that have played all too small a role
in the evaluation of administrative retroactivity. Those factors have
been so often stressed in studies of legislative and judicial retroactivity
that a quick summary will suffice. Retroactivity, summed up Mr.
Justice Rutledge, "is not favored in law. There are few occasions when
retroactivity does not work more unfairly than fairly. Congress, the
state legislatures and the courts apply the principle sparingly, even
where they may." ' Sparing application strives also to protect persons
who have acted in reliance upon what they have justifiably believed to
be existing law, and to preserve stability in the operation of govern-
ment and in contractual and property relations.'
Of reliance,"0 the Supreme Court said in 1872, its protection is
based "upon the highest principles of justice. Parties have a right to
contract, and they do contract in view of the law as declared to them
when their engagements are formed. Nothing can justify . . . hold-
7381 U.S. 618, 628-29 (1965). Relief from a state conviction based upon
unconstitutionally obtained evidence was denied, and Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643
(1961), which invalidated such state convictions, overruling Wolf v. Colorado, 338
U.S. 25 (1949), was limited to prospective operation.
A vigorous attack upon Linkletter by Professor Paul 3. Mishkin, Foreword:
The High Court, the Great Writ, and the Due Process of Time and Law, 79 H Av.
L. REv. 56 (1965), is based in considerable part on the premise that the Blackstonian
"declaratory theory" is a valuable symbol which contributes heavily to respect for
the Court and conduces to acceptance of its rulings. Id. at 62-70. In emphasizing
the values inherent in the theory that judges do not make but rather discover the
"law," Professor Mishkin takes full account of the "realist" argument to the con-
trary. Doubtless his views will generate controversy, as may be surmised from the
earlier controversial literature about the Linkletter problem, cited id. at 57 n.6. To
comment on this controversy would require a full-length article, so that for present
purposes it must suffice that 1) Professor Mishkin acknowledges that the Linkletter
view that courts have power "to make new law effective for the future only" follows
"the general pattern set by prior writing on the subject," id. at 58, and 2) his anal-
ysis is largely cast within the framework of constitutional issues in the Supreme
Court, and there are intimations that issues of "common and statutory law in courts
generally" may be distinguishable, id. at 71, that "outright prospective limitation
may be justified" in circumstances involving "contract or property rights," id. at 70
n.47, and that "even Blackstonian retroactivity need not be given unintelligent, in-
exorable effect." Id. at 77 n.70. The views herein expressed have ample play
within those exceptions.
8 Addison v. Hollyj Hill Fruit Prods., Inc., 322 U.S. 607, 641 (1944) (dissenting
opinion in which Black and Murphy, J.J., joined) ; see also Claridge Apartments v.
Commissioner, 323 U.S. 141, 164 (1944); Leedom v. International Bhd. of Elec.
Workers, 278 F2d 237, 240 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
9 Currier, Time and Change in Judge-Made Law; Prospective Overruling, 51
VA. L. REv. 201, 234-36 (1965); Hochman, The Supreme Court and the Constitu-
tionality of Retroactive Legislation, 73 HARv. L. Rzv. 692-93 (1960); Kocourek &
Koven, supra note 3, at 972, 981-82; Snyder, supra note 4, at 146-48.
10 "The community have a right to regard [a decision made upon solemn argu-
ment and mature deliberation as an] . . . exposition of the law, and to regulate
their actions and contracts by it" 1 KExT, COmmENTARIES ON AmEmICAN LAW *476
(11th ed. Comstock 1867) ; Kocourek & Koven, supra note 3, at 972; Snyder, supra
note 4, at 148; see HART, THz CoNczrv op LAW passim (1961).
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ing them to any other rule." " For "men naturally trust in their
government, and ought to do so, and they ought not to suffer for it." 12
"Certainty" of the law powerfully contributes to "stability," and, said
Bacon, "certainty is so essential to law, that law cannot even be just
without it." 13 It was to avoid retroactive unfairness and disruption
of stable relations that the courts, mistakenly conceiving that prospective
change was beyond their power, clung tightly to stare decisis.1" Though
stare decisis is no longer an "inexorable command," it remains "ordi-
narily a wise rule of action." 15 This is not to suggest that agencies
are less prone to heed precedent than courts but that administrative
departures having undesirable retroactive effects have been too lightly
condoned.1
To posit that agencies, like courts, have or should have discretion
to make decisions retroactive 17 is only the beginning. If judicial dis-
11 Olcott v. Supervisors, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 678, 690 (1872). Cardozo also
stressed the "necessity of avoiding retrospective changes that would frustrate the
reasonable expectations of well-intentioned men." 55 N.Y. STATE BAR Ass'N REP.
263, 294 (1932). He did not insist upon proof of such reliance but stated of an
existing rule that "men have accepted it as law, and have acted on the faith of it. At
least, the possibility that some have done so, makes change unjust, if it were prac-
ticable, without saving vested rights." CARDOZO, LAW AND LITERATURE 53 (1931).
For "presumptions of reliance" see Snyder, supra note 4, at 131.
12 Menges v. Dentler, 33 Pa. 495, 500 (1858).
13 BOWEN, FRANCIS BACON 146 (1963). Said Cardozo, "One does not need to
expatiate upon the value of certainty in a developed legal system." CARDoZO, THE
GROWTH OF THE LAW 3 (1924). And he stated, "What has once been settled by
a precedent will not be unsettled overnight, for certainty and uniformity are gains
not lightly to be sacrificed. Above all else is this true when honest men have shaped
their conduct upon the faith of the pronouncement." CARDOZO, PARADOXES OF LEGAL
SCIENCE 29-30 (1928) ; see CARDoZo, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 149-51
(1921). See also the remarks of Judge Jerome Frank in In re Barnett, 124 F.2d
1005, 1011 (2d Cir. 1942), and in Hammond-Knowlton v. United States, 121 F.2d
192, 204 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 694 (1941). But see Douglas, Stare DecLsis,
49 CoLum. L. REv. 735, 747 (1949).
14 Von Moschzisker, a proponent of retroactivity, recognized that the hardship it
entails "affords a strong argument in favor of adherence to precedent." Von Mosch-
zisker, Stare Decisis in Courts of Last Resort, 37 HARV. L. REv. 409, 423-24 (1924).
So too, Judge Fuld stated, "the courts have rightly been loath to announce new rules
which would adversely affect transactions entered into in reliance on previously de-
clared doctrines." Fuld, The Commissions and the Courts, 40 CORNELL L.Q. 646, 647
(1955). See also Freeman, The Protection Afforded Against the Retroactive Opera-
tion of an Overriling Decision, 18 CoLum. L. REv. 230, 233 (1918); Kocourek &
Koven, supra note 3, at 987; Mishkin, supra note 7.
Certainty "was the essential characteristic of, and the basic reason for, the
common law doctrine of precedent." Goodhart, Precedent in English and Continental
Law, 50 L.Q. REv. 40, 60 (1934). Among other reasons, as Hamilton noted, "to
avoid an arbitrary discretion in the courts, it is indispensable that they should be
bound down by strict rules and precedents . . . ." THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 510
(Mod. Lib. ed. 1941). See also the preface by Judge Cranch of the District of
Columbia Circuit Court to the first volume of his Supreme Court Reports, 5 U.S.
(1 Cranch) iii (1801).
15 Washington v. W. F_ Dawson & Co., 264 U.S. 219, 238 (1924) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
16 See text accompanying notes 37 & 38 and note 38 infra.
17 2 DAvis § 17.07, at 526-29.
374 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol.115:371
cretion is to offer the model, it should be employed with the severe
self-restraint exhibited by the courts, with awareness that the model
has some built-in limitations. For example, the courts have carved
out certain exceptions from the area of retroactivity, notably for the
situation in which an overruling decision would "affect contracts made
or property acquired in reliance upon the decision overruled." IS State
courts in particular have "gone far in protecting rights acquired in
reliance upon a previous decision," 9 and the winds of change are
blowing in the federal courts.so As Cardozo pointed out, "when the
hardship is felt to be too great or to be unnecessary, retrospective op-
eration is withheld." 21 Some agencies have made it a practice to
withhold retroactive operation where hardship might ensue,22 but others
blithely ignore the "contract" exception, the Cardozo formulation and,
indeed, all self-restraint.
Opposition to change is not my theme-self-evidently a legal
system must be responsive to changing needs; I address myself rather
to the manner of its accomplishment. In the administrative domain,
it cannot be sufficiently stressed, agencies, unlike courts, enjoy power
to make prospective changes by use of the legislative "rule-making"
power. Were legislation "a sufficient agency of growth," said Cardozo,
he would have been "half-ready" to put stare decisis in the Constitution
"and to add thereto the requirement of mechanical and literal repro-
duction." ' Such was the value he attached to certainty and uni-
18 Snyder, supra note 4, at 130-31; accord, Kocourek & Koven, supra note 3, at
989. The expansion of the "exception" beyond the area of contract is detailed by
Snyder, supra note 4, at 130-41. CARDozo, THE GROWTH OF THE LAW 81-82 (1924),
calls attention to Dean Pound's "fruitful generalization" that "certain branches of the
law call in conspicuous measure for certainty and order, for an administration of
justice that is strict and in a sense mechanical," among others, "matters of com-
mercial law, and the creation incidents and transfers of obligations." Compare with
such utterances the NLRB treatment of union agreements, at text accompanying
notes 44-77 infra.
19 Freeman, sepra note 14, at 239; accord, Kocourek & Koven, supra note 3, at
988-89; Snyder, spra note 4, at 130-32.
20 Safarik v. Udall, 304 F.2d 944, 949-50 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 901
(1962), refers to "a well-settled exception that courts ordinarily will give prospective
effect only to a decision overruling prior decisions where persons have contracted,
acquired rights, or acted in reliance on the prior decision, and the operation of the
later decision retrospectively would result in substantial harm to such persons." See
also Lyons v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 235 F. Supp. 526, 537 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
21 CARDozo, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 146-47 (1921). (Empha-
sis added.) The quotation is preceded by the statement that "in the vast majority
of cases the retrospective effect of judge-made law is felt either to involve no
hardship or only such hardship as inevitable where no rule has been declared."
Ibid. (Emphasis added.)
22 Safarik v. Udall, 304 F.2d 944, 949 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 901
(1962), refers to the long-standing rule of the Department of Interior "not to give
its . . . decisions retroactive effect, especially when to do so would adversely affect
actions taken and rights and interests acquired by private persons on the faith of
the earlier decisions and would inure to the benefit of other private persons." Cf.
1 DAvs § 5.09, at 352-54.
23 CARDozo, THE GROWTH OF THE LAW 132-33 (1924).
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formity. Administrative agencies have in their own hands and under
their control this very legislative "agency of growth," of correction of
inadequate rules, and it is therefore not too much to require that the
need for retrospective operation be demonstrated rather than airily
assumed to be an essential attribute of administrative adjudication. 4
As Linkletter v. Walker emphasized, there is a need to "weigh the
merits and demerits [of retroactivity] in each case." 2 Let us now
assay administrative retroactivity in light of the self-restraint where-
with retrospection has been employed by the courts and the availability
of "legislative" power which agencies enjoy and courts do not.
The Chenery Case
Widely cited as the leading case for administrative retroactivity,
SEC v. Chenery Corp2 illustrates an inescapable "clarification of un-
certain law" in a case of first impression rather than "a change in
settled law." 17 Chenery did not involve a change of rule, for no rule
had earlier been promulgated by regulation or decision. The SEC "had
not previously been confronted with the problem of management trading
during reorganization"; it was a "case of first impression," 28 and one
that allegedly could not be handled by prospective regulation, for the
Commission had before it an amendment to a corporate plan of re-
organization which it was required to approve or reject. The Supreme
Court said that the amendment had to be consistent with proper stand-
ards and that the SEC could not approve it if it concluded that the
24 Judge Friendly stated that agencies "are, and ought to be, much likelier to
engage both in new departures and in alterations than the courts with their more
limited 'molecular motions' . . ." and that "this makes it peculiarly important for
them to take full advantage of their power to act prospectively, whether by rule-
making or adjudication." NLRB v. Majestic Weaving Co., 355 F.2d 854, 860-61
(2d Cir. 1966).
For facile assumptions that retroactivity should be the administrative norm, see
Deluxe Metal Furniture Co., 121 N.L.R.B. 995, 1006-07 (1958) : "The judicial practice
of applying each pronouncement of a rule of law to the case in which the issue arises
and to all pending cases in whatever stage is traditional and, we believe, the wiser
course to follow." There is no cognizance of judicial self-restraint in the premises,
of judicial exceptions, or of the fact that the tide in general was running powerfully
the other way. So too, in NLRB v. Local 176, United Bhd. of Carpenters, 276
F.2d 583, 586 (1st Cir. 1960), the court said, "If this determination of the Board was
retroactive, it was no more so than whenever a court of law decides, on further
consideration, to modify its earlier views."
2 5 Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 629 (1965). In Chicot County Drainage
Dist. v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U.S. 371, 374 (1940), the Court stated:
The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The effect
of the subsequent ruling as to invalidity may have to be considered in various
aspects . . . .Questions of rights claimed to have become vested, of status, of
prior determinations deemed to have finality and acted upon accordingly,
of public policy in the light of the nature both of the statute and of its previous
application, demand examination.
26 332 U.S. 194 (1947).
272 DAvis § 17.08, at 538.
28 332 U.S. at 203.
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amendment "was inconsistent" with those standards "merely because
there was no general rule or regulation covering the matter." 29 These
considerations led the Ninth Circuit in NLRB v. Guy F. Atkinson Co.
to distinguish Chenery because
there the Commission was confronted with the necessity of
making an order relating to a corporate reorganization in
respect to which it was its duty and obligation to attach
appropriate conditions for approval. . . . The Commission
was operating under compulsion . . . .o
The fact that this was a case of "first impression," coupled with Mr.
Justice Jackson's vehement attack upon the "invalidity of retroactive
lawmaking," " in which he was joined by Mr. Justice Frankfurter,
lends special emphasis, when the case is presented in which the agency
seeks to change an existing rule, to the Court's admonition. An ad-
ministrative agency, it said,
unlike a court, does have the ability to make new law
prospectively through the exercise of its rule-making powers
[and therefore] has less reason to rely upon ad hoc adjudica-
tion to formulate new standards of conduct
and that
the function of filling in the interstices of the Act should be
performed, as much as possible, through this quasi-legislative
promulgation of rules to be applied in the future.32
From this one might conclude with Professor Dodd that an agency's
power "to act retrospectively by order in a particular case should be
29Id. at 201. Professor Davis stated that
the Commission declared that a satisfactory rule could not be formulated.
But that statement is unconvincing, for even though widely varying details
and circumstances might go to the essence, a rule could be flexible in any
desired degree-it could forbid corporate managers to profit by purchase of
the corporation's securities during the reorganization whenever the Commis-
sion finds such a purchase to be detrimental to investors, or it could prohibit
such profit except when the Commission specifically approves. Apart from
rule making, the Commission in this case, had it been sufficiently foresighted,
might have mitigated the retroactive element by advance notice of what was
contemplated. . . . Unlike a court, a commission need not refrain from taking
a position, or a tentative position, until the time comes for announcement of
a decision in a particular case.
2 DAvis § 17.08, at 540.
No more "foresight!' by the Commission was called for than that which the
Commission demanded from the reorganization managers, for the Commission stated,
to borrow from Professor Davis, id. at 535, that "previous legal developments 'indicated
a climate of opinion in which at least some reasonable men considered transactions
of this character to be fraught with temptation and of dubious propriety,'" eminently
the situation in which Professor Davis' suggested cautionary rule could have been
issued.
30 195 F.2d 141, 147 (9th Cir. 1952).
31332 U.S. at 213 (dissenting opinion).
32Id. at 202. (Emphasis added.)
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confined within narrower limits than that of a court," " and, mini-
mally, that a court should feel called on to inquire in a given case why
it was not "possible" to "perform" the task through the "promulgation
of rules to be applied in the future." But Chenery left the choice be-
tween ad hoc adjudication and rule making "primarily in the informed
discretion of the administrative agency." " Little wonder that despite
the Court's "pointed hint" to resort to rule making "as much as
possible," the NLRB, for example, has left the rule-making procedure
virtually untouched.' 5 For a regulation is binding on the administrator
until it is replaced by another regulation,8 which generally operates
33 Note, 56 HARV. L. REV. 1002, 1005 (1943). Professor Davis stated:
A more persuasive dissenting opinion in the Chenery case might have been
written by recognizing that the degree of the Commission's retroactive law
making was substantially the same as that which has long been accepted in
the judicial process, but by emphasizing that agencies should not necessarily
be allowed to imitate courts in this respect. The chief difference is that
agencies can use techniques not easily available to courts for avoiding or
softening the retroactive element. One such technique is rule making. That
a court, having no rule-making power, makes law retroactively through ad-
judication does not mean that an agency may leave its rule-making power
unused and act only through adjudication no matter how serious may be the
disadvantage of retroactive law making in the circumstances.
2 DAvis § 17.08, at 540. Thus far, a Daniel come to judgment. But Professor Davis
apparently concludes that such an opinion should not have been written, because "for
the courts to hold illegal, unfair, unauthorized or unconstitutional what are substan-
tially the same methods of law development that are traditional in the judicial system
may seem to many to be incongruous and impracticable." Id. at 541.
To begin with, the "tradition" was being badly shaken by one attack after an-
other and even as Professor Davis wrote it was waning. And it is more "incongru-
ous" that agencies designed to escape the bonds of tradition, should adopt a harsh
practice which the courts mistakenly believed they themselves were compelled to
adopt. The view of the hypothetical "many," it seems to me, resembles the child's
"he's doing it, why can't I?" And the answer is plain: undesirable practices should
not be imitated. For me, relaxation of the bonds of "evidence" has proved to be
"practicable" and I suggest that avoidance of retroactivity is no less so, as the
example of the courts demonstrates.
84 332 U.S. at 203.
35 See NLRB v. Majestic Weaving Co., 355 F.2d 854, 860 (2d Cir. 1966). This
was not the first time that Judge Friendly had nudged the NLRB to turn to rule-
making procedure. See NLRB v. A.P.W. Prods. Co., 316 F.2d 899, 905 (2d Cir.
1963); FRIENDLY, TuE FEDERAL AD ZINISTRATIVE AGENcIEs 50 (1962). See also
NLRB v. E & B Brewing Co., 276 F.2d 594, 598 (6th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 366
U.S. 908 (1961).
36 Vitarelli v. Seaton, 359 U.S. 535, 539-40 (1959) ; Service v. Dulles, 354 U.S.
363, 388 (1957) ; GE.LLHORN & BYsE, op. cit. mzpra note 1, at 860-62.
If the rule is embodied in a regulation, the agency cannot change it retroactively
by adjudication. Judge Jerome Frank, when Chairman of the SEC, summarized
the law:
If the rule is clearly applicable, the administrative body may not refuse to
apply the rule, merely because it finds the rule unwise. Thus, an administrative
body, confronted with a general rule [of its own making], is like a court
confronted with a specific statute. If the statute is valid and clearly applicable
to the specific case, the court must apply it thereto without regard to its
wisdom.
Consumers Power Co., 6 S.E.C. 444, 477 n.48 (1939) ; see Arizona Grocery Co. v.
Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 284 U.S. 370, 389 (1932); cf. Capital Airlines v. CAB, 171
F.2d 339 (D.C. Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 961 (1949); NLRB v. A.P.W.
Prods. Co., 316 F.2d 899, 906 (2d Cir. 1963) (dictum).
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prospectively, whereas the agencies have been encouraged by the courts
to believe that existing adjudicatory rules may be retroactively changed
without let or hindrance. As one court seductively phrased it, "the
Board is not the slave of its rules," " and other courts have not been
slow to pick up the catchy lyric.3" It is not uncharitable to surmise that
the attractions of such adjudicatory "flexibility" have caused the charms
of rule making to languish in desuetude.
The agency option under Chenery between proceeding by rule
making or by individual ad hoc adjudication, I suggest, has been read
too broadly. Chenery addressed itself to a "case of first impression,"
and it was in this context that the Court stated, "Not every principle
essential to the effective administration of a statute can or should be
cast immediately into the mold of a general rule. Some principles
must await their own development, while others must be adjusted to
meet particular, unforeseeable situations." " Precisely such a particular
situation, the necessity of approving or rejecting a submitted plan of
corporate reorganization, faced the SEC. But as Judge Friendly
pointed out, "the problem of retroactive application has a somewhat
different aspect in cases not of first but of second impression, where an
agency alters an established rule defining permissible conduct which
has been generally recognized and relied on throughout the industry
that it regulates." 40 If the distinction drawn by Professor Davis
between "a clarification of uncertain law" and "a change in settled
law" "' is to be meaningful, retroactivity in a case of second impression,
as Judge Friendly intimated, should meet more exacting requirements
than in a case of first impression. And the Chenery admonition that
the "function of filling in the interstices of the Act should be performed
37 NLRB v. Grace Co., 184 F.2d 126, 129 (8th Cir. 1950). The phrase has chari-
tably been characterized as "offhand." GELLHORN & BYSz, op. cit. supra note 1,
at 863 n.9.
38 Sun Oil Co. v. FPC, 256 F.2d 233, 239 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 872
(1958) ; Foreman & Clark, Inc. v. NLRB, 215 F.2d 396, 410 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
348 U.S. 887 (1954); NLRB v. National Container Corp., 211 F.2d 525, 534 (2d
Cir. 1954). Compare NLRB v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 118 F.2d 780, 789 (9th
Cir. 1941): "since the Board has power to make the rules it has power to suspend
them." Accord, NLRB v. Monsanto Chem. Co., 205 F.2d 763, 764 (8th Cir. 1953).
-3 332 U.S. at 202. The Court explained:
[P]roblems may arise in a case which the administrative agency could not
reasonably foresee, problems which must be solved despite the absence of a
relevant general rule. Or the agency may not have had sufficient experience
with a particular problem to warrant rigidifying its tentative judgment into
a hard and fast rule. Or the problem may be so specialized and varying in
nature as to be impossible of capture within the boundaries of a general rule.
Id. at 202-03. Manifestly these tests ill suit a change in an existing rule, let alone a
sixth change.
4o NLRB v. Majestic Weaving Co., 355 F.2d 854, 860 (2d Cir. 1966).
412 DAvis § 17.08, at 538.
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as much as possible" 42 through rule making has redoubled force when
an agency would change an existing rule. It is therefore a mistake to
invoke Chenery for administrative "authority to adopt and reverse
policy." 11 Whether the majority, which sought in Chenery to facilitate
the handling of a unique situation in a case of first impression, would
have regarded a retroactive reversal of an existing decisional rule as
generously, not to mention a sixth reversal in a case of sixth im-
pression, is at least questionable.
The NLRB "Contract Bar" Rule: Six Retroactive Changes
Retroactive adjudication by the NLRB has often been at the
very antipodes from what was actually decided in Chenery. Contrast
the Chenery "clarification of uncertain law" in a case of first impression
with the NLRB "contract bar" rule that as of 1960 had been altered
"no less than five times" in the Board's twenty-six year history,44 and
in 1963 was changed yet again.45 Where in judicial history can one
point to six retroactive swings of the pendulum by one court in twenty-
nine years with respect to one and the same rule ? 4' And each of the
six changes testified afresh that the prior solutions, a one-year, two-
year, three-year, two-year and then five-year bar had been found
wanting. What is there in this history to inspire confidence that the
latest replacement of the five-year bar by a two-year bar was the
ultimate rich fruit of administrative "experience"? The five changes,
to say the least, afford unpromising material from which to spell out
a compulsion to make still another change harshly retroactive. And
they call for some soul-searching in light of the Supreme Court's
statement that
constant re-examination and endless vacillation may become
ludicrous, self-defeating and even oppressive. Whether for
better or for worse so far as the merits of the chosen course
are concerned, a point may be reached at which the die needs
42 See text accompanying note 32 supra.
43 Optical Workers' Union v. NLRB, 227 F.2d 687, 691 (5th Cir. 1955), cert.
denied, 351 U.S. 963 (1956). (Emphasis added.)
44 The history of the change is recounted in Leedom v. International Bhd. of
Elec. Workers, 278 F.2d 237, 242 n.20 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
45 General Cable Corp., 51 L.R.R.M. 1444 (1962) (three-year "contract bar").
46 In his critique of Linkletter v. Walker, Mishkin states:
Ineluctable retroactivity would seem to operate as an "inherent restraint"
on judicial law making because it compels the Court to confront in sharpest
form the possible undesirable consequences of adopting a new rule, as for
example, when it appears that application of the newly framed doctrine may
result in imposing liability or other burdens on someone who acted in justified
reliance on the old law.
Mishkin, supra note 7, at 70. Apparently awareness of the "inherent restraint" has
eluded the NLRB.
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to be cast with some "finality." An opposition may thus de-
velop between the right result and the final result.4"
A little background of the "contract bar" rule will facilitate con-
sideration of the six changes. The "contract bar" rule protects a valid
collective bargaining agreement for a given period against renewed
union quarrels over representation." Such an agreement may justi-
fiably be relied upon by the contracting union and employer to protect
them from the "expense and turmoil" "' of a fresh election sought by a
rival union. The Board developed the rule to accommodate the con-
flicting goals of the Wagner Act-to promote stabilization of wage
rates and working conditions while assuring workers full freedom of
association and designation of their own representatives.8 0 An impor-
tant consideration in making a collective bargaining agreement "is its
duration," and this is directly influenced by the "contract bar" rule."'
Once such an agreement has been made, a "fundamental . . . statutory
objective of industrial stability . . . has ostensibly been achieved." 82
True it is that at appropriate intervals employees must be permitted
to register afresh their choice of representatives, 3 and the availability
of that option is insured by the "contract bar." But as a former NLRB
General Counsel observed, "Every form of representative government
must necessarily curtail freedom of choice for a period after a choice
has been made . . ."; " and the "competing interest of contract
47 CAB v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 367 U.S. 316, 321 n.5 (1961). Mr. Justice
Brandeis stated that "it is usually more important that a rule of law be settled, than
that it be settled right." Di Santo v. Pennsylvania, 273 U.S. 34, 42 (1927) (dis-
senting opinion, joined by Holmes, J.). See also Freeman, supra note 14, at 231.
48 Friedin, The Board, The "Bar," and the Bargain, 59 COLum. L. Rxv. 61, 62
(1959).
49 Leedom v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 278 F.2d 237, 243 (D.C.
Cir. 1960). Senator Taft referred to "a constant stirring up of excitement by con-
tinual elections." 93 CONG. Rxc. 3838 (1947).
5D Van Arkel, Twenty Years of the NLRB: Unit and Contract Bar Problems in
Representation Cases, 16 OHIO ST. L.J. 360 (1955).
51 Friedin, supra note 48, at 68. "An employer, unwilling to grant all of a union's
demands during a short period may be prepared to grant many over a longer term.
A union, aware of the relevance of the duration of an agreement in the employer's
calculation of costs, may trade them for benefits not otherwise obtainable during a
short term." Ibid. Once negotiated, the "stability of the contract . . . is plainly
a matter of crucial importance to the employer as well as to the contracting union.
The contract bar rules, which can so directly affect the integrity of the agreement, are
thereby bound to affect the parties during their negotiations." Id. at 62.
52 Feldesman, Contract Bar to Representation Elections, 29 GEo. WASH. L. REv.
450 (1960). The "signed agreement has been regarded as the effective instrument
of stabilizing labor relations." H. J. Heinz & Co. v. NLRB, 311 U.S. 514, 524 (1941).
5
3 Feldesman, supra note 52, at 451.
54 Van Arkel, supra note 50, at 377. In discussing the Board's reasoning, Mr.
Justice Frankfurter said: "In the political and business spheres, the choice of the
voters in an election binds them for a fixed time. This promotes a sense of responsi-
bility in the electorate and needed coherence in administration. These considerations
are equally relevant to healthy labor relations." Brooks v. NLRB, 348 U.S. 96, 99
(1954).
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stability required some limit on the employees' freedom to change
representatives . ... " " Since the making of a collective bargaining
agreement unquestionably advances a major, if not the "underlying
purpose," 56 of the act, stable industrial relations or "industrial peace,"
and since "contract stability requires some limitation on the employees'
freedom to change representatives," a limitation expressed in the exist-
ing "contract bar," it may be asked precisely what statutory interest re-
quires the repeated retroactive disruption of such agreements. It is
unsatisfying to be told that the "contract bar" is "a procedural rule
which the Board in its discretion may apply or waive as the facts
of a given case demand." "
A more sophisticated and thorough-going attempt to come to
grips with retroactive changes of the "contract bar" rule was made in
Leedom v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers.5" There the issue
was complicated by the lack of a statutory appeal so that the district
court resorted to the principle that "retroactive application of new
policy . . . constituted an abuse of discretion and therefore amounted
to a deprivation of property without due process of law." " The focus
of discussion in the court of appeals, which rejected this view,' was
whether the change amounted to an invasion of a constitutional right.
Whether a retroactive change of the "contract bar" rule amounts to an
"abuse of discretion" presents a separate issue which can be profitably
examined against the general background of retroactivity. The issue
whether arbitrariness itself amounts to a denial of due process may be
deferred for the moment.0 1
Leedom recognized that "antipathy to retroactive lawmaking by
courts and legislatures has deep historical roots"; 02 it noted the
"fundamental unfairness of retrospective legislation," 3 the "vice in-
herent in retroactivity" in that "it tends to destroy predictability and
65 Friedin, supra note 48, at 63. And in NLRB v. Efco Mfg., Inc., 203 F.2d 458,
459 (1st Cir. 1953), it was said: "The Board has followed a general administrative
policy of not entertaining a petition for certification while the employees concerned
are covered by a collective bargaining agreement which is not approaching expiration.
The objective is to encourage a reasonable stability in existing bargaining relationships."
a6 Brooks v. NLRB, 348 U.S. 96, 103 (1954). "It may be doubted whether
[holding an election in the face of an existing collective agreement] . . . 'encourages'
collective bargaining." Van Arkel, supra note 50, at 360-61.
57NLRB v. Grace Co., 184 F.2d 126, 129 (8th Cir. 1950) ; cf. GymLHORN & Bysu,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: CASES AND CoMMENTs 449 (1954 ed.).
S278 F.2d 237 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
69Id. at 239.
60278 F.2d at 239-40; accord, Local 719, Intl Prod. Employees v. McLeod, 183
F. Supp. 790 (E.D.N.Y. 1960).
61 See text accompanying notes 115-19 infra.
62278 F2d at 240.
63 Ibid.
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to undercut reliance-both important aims of the law." "' The court
then pointed out that "the need for predictability must compete with
the need for change . . . the virtues of stability must be balanced
with the benefits of progress." " And it sought to apply the Chenery
test: " '[The evils of retroactivity] must be balanced against the mis-
chief of producing a result which is contrary to statutory design and
equitable principles.' " 66 Thus the problem was placed in its proper
setting, though I would emphasize that the "need for change" can be
satisfied by resort to prospective rule making.
The Board did not deny in Leedom that "the Union may have
relied upon the existing law when negotiating the contract" and that
"retroactive application of the new bar may work a hardship upon
the Union." 67 Instead it argued that
(1) to apply the bar in futuro would, in some cases, preclude
the Board from putting its new policies fully into effect for
as long as five years from the date the change was announced;
(2) simultaneous administration of the new and old rules
would create an "administrative monstrosity." 8
Prospective operation is always bought at the cost of such disparity
since every time that a rule is announced prospectively there arises a
disparity in treatment between transactions under the old rule and the
new. 9 By the Board's logic retroactivity would become very nearly
inescapable. That which is the norm cannot be "monstrous," i.e.,
abnormal and unnatural. Of the same nature is the Board's argument
that it may have "to wait up to five years [in some instances] to put
its new policies into full effect." 7 That too is always a consequence
of prospective operation: existing transactions are left untouched. The
decisive issue rather is why those transactions should be disrupted
64Ibid.
65 Ibid.
86 Id. at 240-41. Judges Miller and Burger did not join in this part of the opinion;
and, if we are to infer that they dissented therefrom, it is a surprising dissent from
established principles.
6 7 1d. at 241. The Board brazenly urged that the many changes in the past put
the parties "on notice not to rely on the earlier bar." Id. at 242. Could one antici-
pate after years of "experimentation" that "change" would be never-ending? And
what of traditional trust in "law" made by government?
681d. at 242-43.
69 Professor Currier furnished a striking example of the unjust disparity which
would result were the overruling of Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949), by Mapp
v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), confined prospectively. Currier, Time and Change in
Judge-Made Law; Prospective Overruling, 51 VA. L. Rzv. 201, 201-02 (1965). Yet
the Supreme Court did just that in Linkletter. Experience has shown, or at least
the courts have been persuaded, that greater injustice flows from retroactivity tnan
from the disparity occasioned by prospective operation.
70 278 F2d at 243.
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when disruption is admittedly injurious. Professor Currier, who em-
phasized the competing value of equality of treatment, the obverse of
the "disparity" the Board would avoid, and who advocated that retro-
active effect be given to the overruling of a certain constitutional de-
cision, nonetheless stated that "if a person does in fact act in reliance
upon contemporaneous law legitimating certain conduct, the strongest
kind of case can be made out for protecting such reliance." 7"
In Leedom, the court gave a slightly different twist to the Board's
arguments, reasoning that the five-year
drag on the administrative process would tend to destroy its
flexibility. Administrative flexibility is, after all, one of the
principal reasons for the establishment of regulatory agencies.
It permits valuable experimentation and allows administrative
policies to reflect changing policy views. 2
But "valuable experimentation"-and after five ".experiments," one may
ask "How long, Oh Lord"--can also be prospective, without the cost
of unfairness, hardship and repeated unsettlement of the law."3 "Flexi-
bility" is given ample play by the availability of choice between retro-
71 Currier, supra note 69, at 256. And, he stated, "a change in property law fairly
cries out for prospective overruling." Id. at 242.
In Leedom, the court noted that "courts have often upheld statutes which cut off
or modified private contracts where it appeared that the legislation sought to attain
social purposes of greater importance than predictability and reliance." 278 F.2d at
240. It does not appear that this remark was aimed at the judicial "exception" from
retroactivity for contracts. At any rate, the "gold clause" and "mortgage mora-
toriunm" cases, Norman v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 294 U.S. 240 (1935); Home Bldg.
& Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934), appropriately sustained statutes which
retroactively overrode contracts in order to stem the tide of the depression. But the
need for a sixth change of the "contract bar" is incommensurate with the imperative
need to shore up a tottering economy against calamitous insistence upon payment in
gold as per contract, or to stay mortgage foreclosures upon land of farmers made
penniless by a national disaster.
72278 F.2d at 243. The writer of the opinion, Judge Bazelon, reached this con-
clusion "with considerable difficulty." Id. at 240.
73 See text accompanying note 41 supra. Compare Judge Wyzanski's aphorism,
"The administrator is expected to treat experience not as a jailer but as a teacher,"
Shawmut Ass'n v. SEC, 146 F.2d 791, 796-97 (1st Cir. 1945), with Professor Peck's
comments, in what Judge Friendly called a "penetrating article," FRENDLY, THE
FEDEw..ADMINiSTRATivE AGENCIES 43 n.27 (1962) :
[W]hile the ad hoc approach may have been the necessary and proper means
for developing early contract bar principles, it would hardly appear necessary
or even appropriate to a current reformulation of those principles. . . . The
necessity of continuing the experimental approach, with its undesirable conse-
quences upon existing relationships, appears to vanish after twelve years of
experiment and experience with a problem; the Board accumulated a wealth
of basic data upon which broad principles and general rules could be formu-
lated with a certainty that formerly was lacking. In short, this was not one
of those instances where, in the words of the Supreme Court, an ad hoc
approach, with its necessarily retroactive application could be justified . ...
Peck, The Atrophied Rule-Making Powers of the Nationgl Labor Relations Board,
70 YALE L.J. 729, 756 (1961).
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active and prospective operation. 74  It is not essential to regard
retroactivity like a fire alarm which must be sounded from time to time
to demonstrate its readiness. "Flexibility" is merely a tool, not an
end. As such, its "value and validity reside in what proceeds from
[it] ; consequences, not antecedents, supply meaning and verity." 75
The virtue of administrative flexibility therefore resides in how it is
employed, and for present purposes the crucial question is whether the
agency should exercise its "flexible" powers retrospectively because
some overriding purpose outweighs the hardship and unfairness that
will result. The "final principle of selection . . . is one of fitness to
an end." 7 The Board's answers-avoidance of an "administrative
monstrosity" and the alleged need to coordinate all agreements at once
(the court's "drag on the administrative process" )-prove too much,
for they dictate in almost every case that prospective operation be
shelved altogether. Of course, I do not argue for a frozen, immutable
practice, but rather that a departure from the "wise usual policy" of
avoiding retroactive hardship be justified by something more than a
flexing of administrative muscles merely to demonstrate their flexi-
bility, particularly in a case that falls within the well-known judicial
exception for existing contracts.
77
Desirable Retroactivity Illustrated
At the opposite pole from the "contract bar" cases are situations
which more or less plainly demand retrospective operation and which
highlight the differentiation between reasonable and unreasonable
exercise of discretion. In Certified Color Indus. v. Secretary of
Health,7" the act authorized the Secretary to list coal tar colors "which
are harmless" and to certify batches of such colors. The Secretary
revoked a certificate which had permitted the use of certain coal tar
colors in foods, cosmetics and drugs, and quite properly construed the
'74 While Chairman of the SEC, Judge Jerome Frank stated:
The existence of a power to amend old rules and make new ones [via rule
making] permits an administrative body to achieve flexibility without dis-
regarding the provisions of a rule which it has adopted and which stands
unchanged. In view of this power, an existing but inadequate rule may be
remedied, without ignoring its clear language and without, as a result, bringing
the administrative process into disrepute.
Consumers Power Co., 6 S.E.C. 444, 457 (1939).
75 Cardozo, 55 N.Y. STATE BAR ASS'N REP. 263, 294 (1932).
7 6 CARDozo, THE NATURE OF THE JUDIcIAL PRocEss 103 (1921) ; see also id. at
119; CARDOZO, THE GROWTH OF THE LAW 80 (1924).
77 Professor Feldesman noted "the inviolability of contracts recognized generally
by our jurisprudence," in his discussion of the NLRB "contract bar," Feldesman,
supra note 52, at 450, but overlooked the judicial exception carved out from retro-
activity for contracts.
78 283 F.2d 622 (2d Cir. 1960).
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statute to authorize the withdrawal of a certificate of harmlessness
when facts became known which establish that the color is not harm-
less.79 To maintain the prior issuance was irrevocable in these circum-
stances would be to imperil the public health. There can be no vested
right to sell food that contains harmful rather than harmless colors;
protection of the public far outweighed any hardship to the sellers.
Of the same order, though perhaps the equities were more evenly
balanced, is Atlas Tack Corp. v. New York Stock Exch.0 The SEC
delisted the Atlas stock and Atlas complained of retroactive Exchange
standards. Prior to 1955 the Exchange made no reference to "average
net earnings," and Atlas alleged that
in reliance on this known and existing policy, it opened and
operated, at the request of the United States Government, a
magnesium foundry . . . ; that its losses in 1952, 1953 and
1954 were due to this operation. It further argues that, if
it had known its failure to earn at least $200,000 in each of
the years 1952, 1953 and 1954 would later jeopardize its right
to have its securities listed on the Exchange, it would not have
undertaken the aforementioned expansion."'
Undeniably there was hardship which flowed both from the action
undertaken at government request and the absence of any cautions by
the Exchange. But the court, following the Chenery "balancing"
formula, stated that "any retroactive effect of the instant rule should
be weighed against the protection afforded present and potential in-
vestors by delisting securities not suitable for trading on the Ex-
change." 82 Parenthetically, this was not a case of a "change" in an
existing rule but rather the announcement of a rule in a "case of first
impression." The conclusion that protection of investors required
the disclosure of losses notwithstanding the extenuating circumstances
under which they were incurred, and that this weighed more heavily
in the scales than the consequent hardship inflicted on Atlas, cannot,
in my judgment, be stamped as unreasonable, even though reasonable
men might differ as to the weight to be attributed to the competing
factors.
Announcements of Changes of Jurisdiction
Retroactive announcements by the NLRB of changes in existing
rules respecting the jurisdiction it will exercise in the future exhibit
so erratic and capricious a course as to shake confidence in its judgment
79Id. at 626.
80 246 F.2d 311 (1st Cir. 1957).
81 Id. at 317-18.
82 Id. at 318.
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that retroactivity was essential. The Board has changed a juris-
dictional requirement retroactively in order to corral a violator; ' it
has made changes in mid-stream when the consequence was to free
one whom its trial examiner had already found to be a violator.84 It
has refused to make a jurisdictional change retroactive, 4 and, without
adequate explanation, has made such changes retrospective.8" It has
eschewed retroactivity on the ground that it was unfair and inequi-
table," and it has all but ignored those elements in other decisions.
If ever a situation cried out for resort to rule making, it is an
announcement that the Board will no longer take jurisdiction of cases
that had prompted action in the past or that it will take jurisdiction
where it hitherto had declined to do so. Such declarations speak, and
should speak, to the future, a basic criterion of a "rule" or "legislative"
act as contrasted with the application of existing law to past events,
an earmark of adjudication.8 Here the reasons for retroactivity are
at their nadir and, therefore, the Board ought to be required to make
the strongest showing why the change must be retrospective. Con-
sideration of a few cases will illuminate the problem.
Callous use of retroactivity is strikingly illustrated by Pedersen
v. NLRB,' in which the Second Circuit aptly labeled resort thereto a
"species of entrapment." o In response to a Board subpoena Pedersen
83 See text accompanying notes 93-95, 97 and note 98 infra.
84 See text accompanying notes 89-92, 99 infra.
85 See, e.g., C. A. Braukman, 94 N.L.R.B. 1609 (1951).
86 See text accompanying notes 93-95, 97 and note 98 infra.
87 In C. A. Braukman, 94 N.L.R.B. 1609, 1611 (1951), the Board declined to
apply new jurisdictional standards retroactively and to assert jurisdiction where it
had formerly refused to do so, because of its "obligation to respect our prior de-
cisions . . . [and] a desire for fair play. It would be inequitable now to hold
Respondent liable" for activities that occurred at a time when the Board "in effect
advised Respondent" that it would not assert jurisdiction over its operations. This
responds to traditional criteria for avoidance of retroactivity.
88 Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., 211 U.S. 210, 226 (1908). This was the
approach adopted by the House and Senate Reports in explaining "rules" during the
enactment of the Administrative Procedure Act. Rules "formally prescribe a course
of conduct for the future rather than merely pronounce past or existing liabilities."
S. Doc. No. 248, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 254, 197 (1946). And Chairman Walter ex-
plained to the House: "In rule making an agency is not telling someone what his
rights or liabilities are for past conduct or present status under existing law. Instead,
in rule making the agency is prescribing what the future law shall be so far as it is
authorized to act." Id. at 355. The Administrative Procedure Act defines "rule"
as a statement of "future effect." 5 U.S.C. § 551 (4) (Supp. -).
The Board itself explained that after a time it abandoned an "ad hoc approach"
to drawing jurisdictional standards because "experience has shown . . . that juris-
dictional guide lines thus established are extremely time and energy consuming to
apply, and result in confusion and uncertainty as to exactly where the dividing line
will be drawn in particular cases . . . ." Siemons Mailing Serv., 122 N.L.R.B. 81,
83 (1958). In fact, therefore, the Board was issuing regulations, which should be
treated as binding until replaced prospectively. See note 36 supra.
89 234 F.2d 417 (2d Cir. 1956).
9o Id. at 419.
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testified against his employer, who thereupon discharged him in viola-
tion of the statutory prohibition of discharge grounded on such testi-
mony. The employee filed a complaint and the trial examiner, after
hearing, recommended reinstatement. At this point the Board issued
new jurisdictional requirements, decided that the employer's business
did not meet them and dismissed the complaint. Here, as the court
emphasized, "the act which resulted in petitioner's loss of employment
was not [merely] induced by Board action; rather it was compelled
by the Board." "' In colloquial terms, the Board forced Pedersen to
climb out on a limb and then sawed it off, concomitantly releasing a
violator of the statute. The court concluded that the refusal to exercise
jurisdiction was arbitrary and capricious and that the Board's action
was "unjust and intolerable." 92 The fact that the Board could con-
clude in this case that administrative exigencies overrode the hardship
and injustice caused by the Board itself furnishes good reason for
close scrutiny of the reasons it advances in each case for retrospective
decision.
Factually, NLRB v. Pease Oil Co." is quite different. The em-
ployer had discharged employees for union activity in violation of the
act and was ordered by the Board to reinstate them with back pay. No
retroactive interpretation of the act was required to make out the
violation; instead the Board took jurisdiction after it had earlier
announced that it would not, i.e., it changed the prior "jurisdictional
standard" whereunder the Board would not hear complaints relating
to businesses having as little effect upon interstate commerce as that
of respondent. The court rejected the argument that respondent had
"relied" upon the earlier jurisdictional standards on the ground that
this "reliance" was simply an expectation that it might violate the
law with impunity. A statute, it said, "imposes a duty of obedience un-
related to the threat of punishment for disobedience." " Or, as another
court phrased it, Board announcements that jurisdiction would not be
asserted did "not license a company that comes within the purview of
the Act to commit unfair practices at will." " Strictly speaking this
is true; nevertheless there is no blinking the fact that to announce that
certain violators will not be prosecuted is to encourage violation, so
that subsequent prosecution smacks of a "species of entrapment." The
fact that Judge Madden, formerly a distinguished chairman of the
9' Ibid.
92 Id. at 420.
93 279 F2d 135 (2d Cir. 1960).
94 Id. at 137.
1D4NLRB V. Guernsey-Muskingum Elec. Co-op., Inc., 285 F.2d 8, 11 (6th Cir.
1960).
1967]
388 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
NLRB, dissented in Pease Oil Co., partly because he felt that the
retroactive assumption of jurisdiction was lacking in "fair play," " and
that although the Sixth Circuit sustained such a shift, it noted that "it
might not be 'cricket'" to make such a change,9 7 raises the question
whether the courts too mechanically have permitted the Board to
engage in a retroactive hunt for violators whom it led to think
were immune.9"
It is not as if the instinct for fair play must yield to an inexorable
administrative pattern for retroactive sanctions against violators, for
Pedersen glaringly illustrates that the Board has blown both hot and
cold. There a violator who was properly before the Board was
turned loose by a retroactive relinquishment of jurisdiction, even
though the consequence was to leave high and dry an employee who
had testified under Board compulsion. And Pedersen does not stand
alone. In Optical Workers Union v. NLRB,' the union, having
satisfied existing jurisdictional limitations, had a hearing before the
trial examiner, who found that the employer had engaged in unfair
labor practices. The Board then dismissed the complaint because the
employer's volume of business did not satisfy newly announced juris-
dictional standards. Once again the Board relinquished existing juris-
diction and freed a violator who was properly before the Board under
an existing jurisdictional announcement which in effect cautioned that
violators would be prosecuted. Retroactivity was thus invoked in
Pedersen and in Optical to shield a forewarned violator, from which
it may be deduced that the element of "violation" little influenced the
Board's thinking, or for that matter that of the court, which said in
Optical "there is no sound reason why standards cannot be applied
retroactively." '0o When Optical and similar cases 1o1 are compared
96 279 F.2d at 140.
9 7 NLRB v. West Side Carpet Cleaning Co., 329 F.2d 758, 760 (6th Cir. 1964).
Compare the Board's own limitation of back pay awards "in consideration of its prior
position" that it had no jurisdiction. NLRB v. Baltimore Transit Co., 140 F.2d 51,
55 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 321 U.S. 795 (1944).
98 See NLRB v. West Side Carpet Cleaning Co., supra note 97; NLRB v.
Guernsey-Muskingum Elec. Co-op., Inc., 285 F.2d 8, 11 (6th Cir. 1960); NLRB v.
Jones Lumber Co., 245 F.2d 388, 391 (9th Cir. 1957); NLRB v. Gottfried Baking
Co., 210 F.2d 772, 781 (2d Cir. 1954); NLRB v. Kobritz, 193 F.2d 8, 12 (1st Cir.
1951), petition to vacate denied, 201 F.2d 156 (1st Cir. 1953). The statement in
Guernsey-Muskingum that "a prohibitory law does not become effective only when
there is danger of a violator being caught," 285 F.2d at 11, and in Jones Lumber that
the Board's jurisdictional announcements "could not limit the jurisdiction conferred
by Congress," 245 F.2d at 391, seem to me to misconceive the issue. Of course, the
Board cannot alter what Congress provides. But "it is not required by the statute
to move on every point, it is merely enabled to do so." NLRB v. Indiana & Mich.
Elec. Co., 318 U.S. 9, 18 (1943), and the issue is whether it should be precluded from
moving because of its conduct.
99 227 F.2d 687 (5th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 963 (1956).
'Do Id. at 691.
101 Pedersen v. NLRB, 234 F.2d 417 (2d Cir. 1956); Local 12, Progressive Mine
Workers v. NLRB, 189 F.2d 1 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 868 (1951).
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with Pease, it is apparent that the Board itself has removed the urgency
of a retroactive hunt for violators, and worse, that it proceeds without
rhyme or reason, the worst possible basis for injurious retroactivity.
Indeed, the capricious prosecutions themselves suggest arbitrariness.0 2
Minimally, the Board's repeated judgment that retroactive punishment
of violators is inconsequential takes the steam out of judicial statements
that Board announcements that it will not exercise jurisdiction cannot
be regarded as a license for violation.
Hardship and Arbitrary Retroactivity
In SEC v. Chenery Corp.,1 3 a case of administrative first impres-
sion, the Court stated that retroactivity is condemned if its "ill effect"
is not outweighed by the "mischief" to the public interest.0 4  A stiffer
standard might be expected in a change-of-rule case; yet Leedom, as
we have seen, held that conceded hardship-abrogation of a union
102 See NLRB v. Pease Oil Co., 279 F.2d 135, 138 (2d Cir. 1960): "[E]nforce-
ment has been denied where the Board has appeared to the court to have been arbi-
trary and capricious in refusing to consider other complaints of a similar nature to
the one before the court."
Without "a uniform practice and method of procedure for the commencement
and conduct of contests" it "is perfectly obvious that even-handed justice to all liti-
gants can [not] be impartially administered . . . ." Germania Iron Co. v. James,
89 Fed. 811, 813, 818 (8th Cir. 1898). "What a farce," it was said in Howe v. Parker,
190 Fed. 738, 757 (8th Cir. 1911), "the attempt to secure and protect rights in any
judicial or quasi-judicial tribunal must become if its rules and decisions are imposed
or applied to each case as it arises at the arbitrary will of the officer who presides."
Cf. McKay v. Wahlenmaier, 226 F.2d 35 (D.C. Cir. 1955); United States ex rel.
Knauff v. McGrath, 181 F.2d 839, 841 (2d Cir. 1950), vacated as moot, 340 U.S. 940
(1951) ; Hammond-Knowlton v. United States, 121 F.2d 192, 204 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 314 U.S. 694 (1941) ; Thompson v. Spear, 91 F.2d 430, 434 (5th Cir. 1937),
cert. denied, 302 U.S. 762 (1938); International Business Mach. Corp. v. United
States, 343 F.2d 914, 919-20 (Ct Cl.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1028 (1965); Berchem
v. Reconstruction Fin. Corp., 191 F.2d 922, 924-25 (Emer. Ct. App. 1951).
For cases that have sustained "inconsistent" treatment, see 2 DAvis § 17.07, at
528-30. Their rationalizations, to my mind, amount to little more than abdication
of judicial responsibility. "One of the most fundamental social interests is that the
law shall be uniform and impartial. There must be nothing in its action that savors
of prejudice or favor or even arbitrary whim or fitfulness. Therefore in the main
there shall be adherence to precedent." CARwozo, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL
PROCESS 112 (1921) ; see also id. at 33-34. The view that "perhaps the courts should
not impose upon the agencies standards of consistency of action which the courts
themselves customarily violate," 2 DAvis § 17.07, at 530, calls for correction, rather
than slavish imitation, of judicial error. For "it will not do to decide the same
question one way between one set of litigants and the opposite way between another.
'If a group of cases involves the same point, the parties expect the same decision.
It would be a gross injustice to decide alternate cases on opposite principles.'"
CARDozo, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 33 (1921) ; see also CARD0ZO, PARA-
DOXES OF LEGAL SCIENCE 97 (1928). Of course it is always open to a tribunal to
determine that there is a sufficient difference in the facts at bar to warrant a deviation
from a principle or the application of another.
103 332 U.S. 194 (1947).
104 "Retroactivity must be balanced against the mischief of producing a result
which is contrary to a statutory design or to legal and equitable principles. If that
mischief is greater than the ill effect of the retroactive application of a new standard,
it is not the type of retroactivity-which is condemned by law." Id. at 203.
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agreement-was outweighed by the need for administrative "flexi-
bility." 105 Nevertheless, it is safe to say, for example, that given
visible pecuniary hardship, decisional retroactivity will be deemed arbi-
trary. NLRB v. Guy F. Atkinson Co.,"0 8 an oft-cited case, is illus-
trative. An employer turned to a union for help in recruiting for an
Atomic Energy Commission construction project and then entered
into an agreement with the union. At union request an employee who
failed to pay union dues was discharged. The Board had not as yet
announced the rule that where a work force was expanding rapidly,
an agreement at an early stage would not constitute the union the
appropriate bargaining unit. After the discharge and ensuing com-
plaint, the Board abandoned its permissive attitude,' held that the
discharge constituted an unfair labor practice and ordered the rein-
statement of the employee with payment of back pay. In short, the
Board retroactively penalized the employer for acting pursuant to a
union agreement that was valid when made and that advanced a
prime objective of the act-industrial peace. Justifiably the court re-
fused to allow retrospective effect to the change because, following the
Chenery formula, retroactivity worked
hardship upon respondent altogether out of proportion to the
public ends to be accomplished. The inequity of such an
impact of retroactive policy making upon a respondent
innocent of any conscious violation of the act, and who was
unable to know, when it acted, that it was guilty of any
[misconduct] . . . is manifest. It is the sort of thing our
system abhors.' 8
105 See text accompanying note 72 supra.
1o13195 F.2d 141 (9th Cir. 1952).
1
0 7 The Board also changed its earlier rule that it would not take jurisdiction
of the construction industry, but the case is generally associated with the retroactive
banning of a union.
108 195 F.2d at 149. Writing in 1958, Professor Davis stated, "The Atkinson
case is an unreliable I authority, for many similar cases go the other way .... "
2 DAvis § 17.03, at 508, and that "the various cases opposed to the Atkinson case
represent stronger authority and may be preferable in their understanding of principle."
Id. § 17.09, at 543. It is true that most of the cases do sustain the retroactive assump-
tion or relinquishment of jurisdiction, though I should question whether they exhibit
a better "understanding of principle." See text accompanying notes 96-102 supra.
But on the more important branch of the case, the retrospective imposition of a
penalty for conduct that was innocent at the time, the Atkinson view is shared by
other courts. See cases cited note 109 infra; NLRB v. Local 41, Teamsters Union,
225 F.2d 343, 348 (8th Cir. 1955).
In NLRB v. Majestic Weaving Co., 355 F.2d 854, 860 (2d Cir. 1966), Judge
Friendly stated that judicial "hackles bristle still more when a financial penalty is
assessed for action that might well have been avoided if the agency's changed dispo-
sition had been earlier made known . . . ." Leedom purported to distinguish
Atkinson because there "the Board made conduct actionable which theretofore had
not been actionable." 278 F.2d at 243. Compare NLRB v. Guernsey-Muskingum
Elec. Co-op., Inc., 285 F.2d 8, 11 (6th Cir. 1960) ("only if it creates an inequitable,
situation by its change of policy can its right and duty to enforce the law be curbed
by the court"); Pedersen v. NLRB, 234 F.2d 417 (2d Cir. 1956) ; NLRB v. Daboll,
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There are other decisions to the same effect,1' 9 one of which will be
quoted at length because the court so clearly responded to traditional
judicial criteria. In NLRB v. Local 41, Teamsters Union,"O a retro-
active change in the Board's position toward employee seniority pro-
visions was rejected. Earlier Board decisions had sustained "identical"
union seniority provisions, but in the Local 41 case the Board outlawed
them and ordered the union to make whole employees who had sus-
tained losses as a result of prior seniority priorities under its agreement.
Not doubting the "soundness of the new view," the court said,
we do not believe that the spirit of the Act . . . entitles the
Board, on engaging in such an about-face . . . to brand a
party as being guilty of an unfair labor practice in having
made such a contract provision, while the Board's express
holding that the provision is a proper one under the Act has
remained unrenounced.
[I]t does not seem to us to make either legal or common
sense to say that the Board's rulings are wholly without any
sanctity under the Act as a guide for employer or Union
conduct, but that the Act intends that anyone who relies
upon and uses the Board's rulings as a basis for his actions
shall be left subject to entrapment and branding as the
perpetrator of an unfair practice in what he has thus done,
216 F.2d 143, 144 (9th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 917 (1955) ("the courts
will not disturb that.discretion unless the Board has acted in violation of previously
prescribed standards upon which the employer had a right to rely, and the disregard
of which would lead to an injustice."). NLRB v. Pease Oil Co., 279 F.2d 135, 139
(2d Cir. 1960), adverted to the Atkinson pivotal fact that "the party charged with
an unfair labor practice was 'innocent of any conscious violation of the act.'" See
the Guernsey-Muskingum statement that Atkinson and Pease "are not in conflict."
285 F.2d at 11.
Professor Davis himself has stated that "probably the courts should sometimes
intervene to protect against unfairness resulting from an administrative adjudication
which retroactively changes law on which a party has relied." 2 DAvis § 17.09, at 544.
109 In NLRB v. E & B Brewing Co., 276 F.2d 594 (6th Cir. 1960), cert. denied,
366 U.S. 908 (1961), a "hiring hall" case, the Board ordered reinstatement of an
employee with back pay because of an alleged unfair labor practice. The court said,
"the contract, perfectly legal and valid according to the Board's settled rule at the
time it was made, has now, retroactively, been adjudged per se illegal for want of one
of the Board's three protective clauses demanded under its new ruling." Id. at 600.
Citing Atkinson, the court concluded that the retrospective change would "work
hardship upon respondent altogether out of proportion to the public ends to be
accomplished." Ibid. In another "hiring hall" case, NLRB v. Local 176, United
Bhd. of Carpenters, 276 F.2d 583, 586 (1st Cir. 1960), the court rejected the Board's
order of "disgorgement of dues, requiring the union to refund to every member who
had obtained employment the dues he had paid," because the union "conduct was
recognized as unlawful only after it had occurred." In a similar case, Morrison-
Knudsen Co. v. NLRB, 275 F.2d 914, 918 (2d Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 909
(1961), the court declared that the Board's retrospective requirement of reimburse-
ment was "inappropriate and arbitrary." See also Yellow Transit Freight Lines v.
United States, 221 F. Supp. 465, 468, 470 (N.D. Tex. 1963), an ICC case. See also
notes 21 & 108 supra.
110 225 F.2d 343 (8th Cir. 1955).
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if the Board thereafter chances . . . to depart from one of
its previous positions and rulings."
In sum, the cases demonstrate that an agency does not enjoy untram-
meled discretion to make retroactive decisions, and that this discretion,
like all discretion, must not be exercised in arbitrary fashion. Arbi-
trary action or abuse of discretion-the terms are used interchange-
ably "--describes the unreasonable, oppressive use of delegated
power."' The inquiry, it has been said in the labor relations area,
is whether the "situation and circumstances clearly show an abuse of
discretion, that is arbitrary action not justifiable in view of such situa-
tion and circumstances." "' Before I turn to the quantum of hardship
that is required to make out arbitrariness, let me venture a word on the
"constitutional" question that was central to the Leedom case. If arbi-
trariness be found, it is clear that it constitutes a denial of due process.
The Supreme Court has epitomized "due process" as the "protection
of the individual against arbitrary action." "I It has stated that the
Constitution condemns "all arbitrary exercise of power," " that "dele-
gated power, of course, may not be exercised arbitrarily," "' that
"there is no place in our constitutional system for the exercise of
M Id. at 348.
112"[Albuse of discretion" is "arbitrary action not justifiable" in the circum-
stances. NLRB v. Guernsey-Muskingum Elec. Co-op., Inc., 285 F.2d 8, 11 (6th
Cir. 1960). "Discretion .. .is abused when the judicial action is arbitrary, fanciful
or unreasonable . . . ." Delno v. Market St. Ry., 124 F.2d 965, 967 (9th Cir. 1942) ;
see Gonzalez v. Freeman, 334 F.2d 570, 580 (D.C. Cir. 1964); Western Airlines v.
CAB, 184 F.2d 545, 551 (9th Cir. 1950).
113 For various definitions see Berger, Administrative Arbitrariness and Judicial
Review, 65 CoLum. L. REv. 55, 82-83 (1965). In Wong Wing Hang v. Immigration
& Naturalization Serv., 360 F.2d 715, 719 (2d Cir. 1966), judge Friendly stated that
action is abuse of discretion which, if taken "without a rational explanation, inex-
plicably departed from established policies . . "
114NLRB v. Guernsey-Muskingum Elec. Co-op., Inc., 285 F.2d 9, 11 (6th Cir.
1960). See also note 102 supra. Cf. NLRB v. Majestic Weaving Co., 355 F.2d 854,
861 (2d Cir. 1966), where Judge Friendly stated that "where for fifteen years the
Board considered conditional negotiation consistent with the statutory design 'the ill
effect of the retroactive application of a new standard' so far outweighs any demon-
strated need for immediate application to past conduct . . . as to render the action
'arbitrary.'"
The focus of inquiry has been "whether the Board abused its discretion." NLRB
v. Guernsey-Muskingum Elec. Co-op., Inc., 285 F.2d 9, 11 (6th Cir. 1960) ; cf. NLRB
v. Daboll, 216 F.2d 143, 144 (9th Cir. 1954). In NLRB v. Pease Oil Co., 279 F.2d
135, 138 (2d Cir. 1960), it was said that "cases where courts have held that the
Board abused its discretion fall into three clearly defined categories .
Atkinson, which the court cited, did not fall within any of the "three categories,"
and indeed "abuse of discretion" is endlessly varied.
115 Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 301 U.S. 292, 302 (1937). Arbi-
trary application of a statute is unconstitutional. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356,
373-74 (1886). Arbitrarily to cause an alien to be deported is incompatible with
due process. The Japanese Immigration Case, 189 U.S. 86, 101 (1903).
116 ICC v. Louisville & N.R.R., 227 U.S. 88, 91 (1913).
17 FCC v. Schreiber, 381 U.S. 279, 292 (1965).
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arbitrary power." "' Power is not delegated to administrators to make
oppression possible."'
The Measure of Hardship
The Chenery formula, framed in a case of "first impression," called
for a balancing of the "ill effect of the retroactive application of a new
standard" against the "mischief of producing a result which is contrary
to a statutory design or to legal and equitable principles." '0 When
courts hold that agencies are free to change their rules retroactively
at will, they ignore this "balancing" formula altogether.'' Apart from
Leedom, which balanced the need for "flexibility" against conceded
"hardship," 122 the courts have indulged in little refined dissection of
the factors involved. Any attempt at "weighing" must first take into
account that the scales should be more heavily weighted against retro-
activity in a "change of rule" case than in a case of "first impression"
such as Chenery. Second, "weighing" requires close examination of
the "mischief" that is expected to flow from rejection of retroactivity
rather than assumption that exclusion of retroactivity will be injurious.
For as Cardozo stated, if hardship is "unnecessary, retrospective op-
eration is withheld." " Third, "hardship" itself need not be weighed
in an apothecary's scales unless the opposing considerations are finely
balanced.
The measure of hardship, to my mind, has been unduly compli-
cated. To begin with, the measure, contrary to an intimation in
Leedom, has not been evidence of "gross injustice." 124 The words
"gross injustice" were employed in Tidal Oil Co. v. Flanagan 12 to
"explain" Gelpcke v. City of Dubuque,12 which Tidal Oil in fact
repudiated on "diversity jurisdiction" grounds. In Gelpcke, the Court
was faced with a state court decision that overruled a prior state court
construction of a state statute. Municipal bonds had been purchased in
reliance on the earlier decision which held them valid. Despite the
118 Garfield v. United States ex rel. Goldsby, 211 U.S. 249, 262 (1908). Our
institutions "do not mean to leave room for the play and action of purely personal
and arbitrary power." Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886). See also
Bank of Columbia v. Okely, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 235, 244 (1819).
119 See Berger, Administrative Arbitrariness and Judicial Review, 65 COLUm.
L. Rxv. 55, 56-57 (1965).
120 332 U.S. at 203; see note 104 supra.
121 See notes 37 & 38 supra and accompanying text.
122 See text accompanying notes 67 & 72 mtpra.
123 See text accompanying note 21 mipra.
124 278 F.2d at 241. Although the court purported to state a criterion for judicial
retroactivity, the framework of the case was administrative retroactivity, and I am
therefore evaluating the "gross injustice" phrase in that context.
125263 U.S. 444, 452 (1924).
12668 U.S. (1 Wall.) 175 (1864).
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"diversity" rule that courts will follow a state court construction of
a state statute which overrules an earlier construction,'2 7 the Supreme
Court felt compelled to adopt the earlier construction "upon the plainest
principles of justice," 128 notwithstanding that the consequence was to
warp the "diversity" rule. Gelpcke affords an extreme example of
the lengths to which a court will go to avoid hardship when reliance
upon an earlier rule is undercut. 29 The retrospective invalidation of
bonds purchased in reliance upon an existing adjudicatory rule seems
no more "gross injustice" than the retroactive impairment of a "col-
lective bargaining agreement," unless we are to conclude out of hand
that the "expense and turmoil," for both union and employer, of an
election sought by a rival union, bears no comparison to the hurt
suffered by the holder of an invalidated bond. The existing union
runs the risk of unexpected displacement; the employer risks renegotia-
tion with a possibly more obdurate rival union. If anything, the bitter-
ness of industrial strife, the losses that flow from jurisdictional
squabbles, the statutory and social goal of "industrial peace," make out
a stronger reason for protection of a union agreement. 30 Nor is it
self-evident that the financial hardship consequent upon an order for
back pay to an employee in the Atkinson and Pedersen cases is in-
commensurate with the hardship that flows from the unexpected union
contest with a rival in the teeth of an existing agreement. Judge
Friendly purported to distinguish Leedom, where a retroactive change
in the "contract bar" rule was sustained, saying that "a decision brand-
ing as 'unfair' conduct stamped 'fair' at the time a party acted, raises
judicial hackles considerably more than a determination that merely
• . shortens the period in which a collective bargaining agreement
may bar a new election," 131 but one trusts that he was judiciously
confining himself to the case at bar. For the branding of "unfair"
upon practices earlier stamped "fair" seems no more culpable than
nullification of a contract admittedly stamped valid when made.
While it is probably true, as Judge Friendly stated, that judicial
"hackles bristle . . .more when a financial penalty is [retroactively]
127 Leffingwell v. Warren, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 599, 603 (1862). Gelpcke recog-
nized that it "is the settled rule of this court, in such cases, to follow the decisions
of the State courts," 68 U.S. at 206, but it purportedly carved out an exception.
See id. at 205.
1281d. at 206.
129 The Court's revulsion to retroactivity is underscored by its remark, "We
shall never immolate truth, justice, and the law, because a state tribunal has erected
the altar and decreed the sacrifice." 68 U.S. at 206-07.
130 Professor Peck adverts to the "inevitably unsettling effect that pending elec-
tions have upon labor relations and production." Peck, The Atrophied Rule-Making
Powers of the National Labor Relations Board, 70 YALE L.J. 729, 739 (1961).
131 NLRB v. Majestic Weaving Co., 355 F.2d "854, 860 (2d Cir. 1966). "
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assessed," 132 the fact remains that in rejecting retroactivity courts have
repeatedly acted upon what they said were the "plainest principles of
justice," 133 and that hardship is but one element that needs to be
weighed in consideration of retroactivity. Judicial emphasis on finan-
cial hardship tends to obscure that other elements are also entitled to
weight: there is the affront to the sense of fair play, unfairness, the
betrayal of reliance on existing law by people who are entitled to order
their transactions in reliance on it, and the unsettlement of past trans-
actions to the detriment of certainty whilst making discrimination
possible. All of these deserved to be weighed against flimsy agency
explanations for resort to retroactive decisions, the more so as the
impact of retroactivity has from time to time evoked expressions of
judicial abhorrence. Certainly the reasoning of the back pay cases
emphasized financial hardship no more than the other elements. In-
stead, therefore, of starting with built-in assumptions that retroactivity
is the norm which the victim must overthrow, I suggest that retro-
spection starts and should start with a handicap.
A Suggested Presumption Against Retroactive
Administrative Decisions
If we are to take seriously statements that there is a deep-rooted
"antipathy to retrospective law-making," 134 that retrospective operation
is fundamentally "unfair," 135 it is reasonable to require a demon-
stration that it is indeed "the lesser evil," 136 before it is permitted.
This in turn can be translated into a presumption against a retroactive
change of rule, the obverse of Cardozo's postulate that "certainty and
regularity have at least a presumption in their favor." 137 When an
agency seeks retroactively to substitute a new decisional rule for an
existing one, it should take the laboring oar on review, all the more be-
cause what it seeks to do is generally regarded with disfavor. If it
cannot muster substantial reasons for the allowance of retroactivity, it
should be confined to prospective change. The courts would still be
132 Ibid.
133 Gelpcke v. City of Dubuque, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 175, 206 (1864). For
additional cases see Snyder, Retrospective Operation of Overruling Decisions, 35 ILL.
L. REv. 140-42 (1940).
134 See text accompanying note 62 supra. Hochman refers to the "hostility to
retroactive legislation [which] will lead the Court to hold unconstitutional a statute
whose retroactive application serves 'no discernible public purpose.'" Hochman, The
Supreme Court and the Constitutionality of Retroactive Legislation, 73 HARV. L. REV.
692, 697 (1960).
135 See text accompanying note 63 supra.
136 Retroactivity was chosen as "the lesser evil" in Addison v. Holly Hill Fruit
Prods., Inc., 322 U.S. 607, 622 (1944).
137 Cardozo, 55 N.Y. STATE BAR Ass'N REP. 263, 284 (1932).
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called upon to weigh the competing values that are at stake in any
given case. And the fact that some agencies make it a rule to withhold
retrospective effect from their decisions shows that it is practical to
do So.138 A presumption, for example, would serve to correct the
whimsical, erratic course pursued by the NLRB by compelling it to
weigh more seriously whether the public interest really requires a
retroactive decision and, better, to demonstrate the need to a reviewing
court. Such a presumption might go far to rationalize administration
Lnd to dispel the confusion which now runs rife through the cases. It
would put teeth into the "antipathy to retroactive law-making," and
it would put motive power behind the Court's exhortation in Chenery
to employ rule making "as much as possible."
What of the dictum in Chenery, it may be asked, which leaves
the choice between rule making and adjudication in the "informed dis-
cretion" of the agency. That statement was made in a "case of first
impression"; given an adjudicatory change in an existing rule it should
be read against the Court's declaration in 1833 that administrative
"cusage" may not be retrospectively changed and "must be considered
as binding on past transactions," ' and its 1872 statement that con-
tracting parties "have a right" to rely on existing law and "nothing
can justify us in holding them to any other rule." "' Then too, the
entire judicial attitude toward retroactivity has undergone a marked
transformation since Chenery. When Chenery was decided in 1947,
only fifteen years had elapsed since Mr. Justice Cardozo's opinion in
Great No. Ry. v. Sunburst Oil & Ref. Co. 4' burst like a meteor before
a profession still under the spell of the declaratory theory. 142  Courts,
138 See note 22 supra.
139 United States v. Macdaniel, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 1, 15 (1833).
140 Olcott v. The Supervisors, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 678, 690 (1872).
141287 U.S. 358 (1932).
142 See, e.g., Ruppert v. Ruppert, 134 F.2d 497, 500 (D.C. Cir. 1942) ; Peterson
v. John Hancock Mut. Ins. Co., 116 F.2d 148, 151 (8th Cir. 1940); City of Chelsea
v. Richard T. Green Co., 318 Mass. 85, 87, 60 N.E.2d 351, 352 (1945).
In 1940, Professor Snyder, despairing of "succeeding where the mighty have
failed, accept[ed] the [declaratory] theory," Snyder, supra note 133, at 122, saying
that "it enlists habitual modes of thought," id. at 152, and within that framework
sought to synthesize the declaratory theory with a denial of retroactive operation to
overruling decisions. Id. at 145-53.
Chenery must also be weighed in light of the Supreme Court's subsequent ad-
monition in Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 490 (1951), "that the
Administrative Procedure Act and the Taft-Hartley Act direct that courts must now
assume more responsibility for the reasonableness and fairness of Labor Board decisions
. . . . Congress has imposed upon them responsibility for assuring that the Board
keeps within reasonable grounds." (Emphasis added.)
It is questionable whether the agencies can lay claim to "special competence" to
determine whether retroactivity is unfair. "We deal with a problem which courts
have frequent occasion to consider and upon which we think it cannot be said that
the board or commission has superior opportunity for knowledge." NLRB v., Guy
F. Atkinson Co., 195 F.2d 141, 151 (9th Cir.-1952);
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it will be recalled, felt themselves wedded to retroactivity because of their
attachment to the declaratory theory. Thenceforth a "daringly ex-
perimental" court could confine its decisions to prospective operation.
Chenery was decided, therefore, in an atmosphere where retroactivity
was still the norm, and its recognition of the possibility of choice in
a case of first impression between prospective and retrospective opera-
tion carried forward the Sunburst innovation. With the advent of
Linkletter v. Walker,14 the skies have cleared. No longer is retro-
activity viewed as a necessary concomitant of adjudication; to the
contrary, it is to follow only after a weighing of relevant factors. That
shift of judicial opinion calls for reconsideration of the whole problem
of retroactive administrative adjudication.
Even before Linkletter was decided, the Second Circuit, per
Judge Medina, said,
there are certain general policy considerations that we think
make it generally undesirable to give retroactive effect to
overruling decisions, except under the most compelling
circumnstances.'44
This formulation is but an offshoot of a broad principle that played a
greater role at the inception of our government than it does in adminis-
trative circles today, the salutary principle that government, as was
said in Anderson v. Dunn,'45 should employ "the least possible power
adequate to the end proposed." 14 Or, as James Wilson earlier phrased
it, "every wanton, or causeless, or unnecessary act of authority
'is wrong, and unjustifiable, and tyrannical .. 1 47 It is not too
much to ask that when governmental action may be injurious, when
it smacks of "unfairness," when it defeats just reliance on existing
decisional rules, when it disturbs the certainty that feeds the roots of
the law and fosters discrimination, an agency should carry the burden
of proving that it is truly "necessary." 148
143 381 U.S. 618 (1965) ; see note 7 and text accompanying note 25 mipra.
144 United States ex reL Angelet v. Fay, 333 F.2d 12, 21 (2d Cir. 1964). (Em-
phasis added.)
'45 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 93 (1821).
146 Id. at 105.
1472 WILSON, WoRxs 393 (Andrews ed. 1896). Compare Mr. Justice Brandeis'
statement that the "right to be let alone" is "the most comprehensive of rights"
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (dissenting opinion).
Wilson had been one of the most active framers of the Constitution, and he "had
done most of the actual drafting work for the Convention's Committee of Detail."
2 CROSSKLY, POLmCS AND THE CONSTITUTION 1040 (1953). In 1789 his explanation
of the Constitution to the Pennsylvania Ratification Convention was cited in the
First Congress as that of the "celebrated Mr. Wilson." 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 577
(1789). He became a Justice of the Supreme Court.
148 Compare the statement by Cardozo at text accompanying note 21 upra,
